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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Socioeconomics sheds important light on lawyers’ professional 
responsibilities of competence and candor regarding law-related 
economic issues.  It also sheds light on the duty to facilitate client 
understanding of the legal process and the duty to improve the law both 
for clients and for the good of society.  In addition, an introduction to 
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socioeconomics will empower students by giving them a sounder basis 
for understanding the ethical responsibilities of their teachers when 
they teach law-related economic issues.  An understanding of 
socioeconomics and its relation to law can also enrich students’ 
understanding of professional responsibility and its importance 
throughout the curriculum. 
In an earlier article regarding the role socioeconomics plays in the 
practice of law, I advanced the following thesis: The requirements of 
competence and candor and the duty to improve the law, as set forth in 
the rules and codes of professional responsibility, call for lawyers to take 
a socioeconomic approach when considering economic issues.1  As 
summarized in Part II below, this thesis is based on (1) the essential role 
of the lawyer in helping people to identify and secure their rights and 
obligations, (2) the professional responsibilities related to competence, 
candor, and the duty to improve the law, and (3) a definition of 
socioeconomics set forth in a petition signed by over 120 law professors 
from over fifty American law schools to establish the Section on Socio-
Economics of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).2  This 
Article extends this thesis to law teaching; lest they teach by bad 
example, law teachers should also take a socioeconomic approach to 
law-related economic issues. 
Part II of this Article provides a summary of the foregoing thesis and 
discusses the lawyer’s ethical duties of competence and candor, and the 
duties to improve the law and assist clients in gaining competence 
regarding law-related economic issues.  Part III discusses some positive 
and normative deficiencies of the neoclassical approach to teaching law 
and economics.  Part IV discusses the need for a socioeconomic approach to 
law and economics.  Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
II.  PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE CALL TO TAKE A 
SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW-RELATED                                       
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
A.  Introduction 
The thesis that the rules and codes of professional responsibility call 
 
 1. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611, 622–23.  2. The definition of socioeconomics is set forth and discussed in Robert Ashford, 
What Is Socioeconomics?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 5 (2004). 
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for lawyers and law teachers to take a socioeconomic approach when 
considering economic issues can be summarized as follows: (1) 
Competence and candor call upon lawyers (a) to look at the client as a 
whole person in full context (unless the representation is explicitly 
limited), (b) to distinguish between facts and values, (c) to distinguish 
between the important and the less important, (d) to understand the 
significance of evidence in context, (e) to understand the weaknesses (as 
well as the strengths) in the positions supporting the interests of clients 
and adversaries, and (f) to offer as an essential part of the representation 
moral and other considerations beyond those of a purely economic 
dimension,3 (2) lawyers have an affirmative duty to assist clients in 
understanding their essential rights, responsibilities, opportunities, risks, 
and uncertainties under the law, and to improve the law, not only for the 
benefit of clients, but also for the benefit of society,4 (3) socioeconomics 
is an approach to economics that (a) is grounded in the scientific method, 
(b) is informed by classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, institutional, 
binary, and other approaches relevant to economic understanding, (c) yet 
accepts none of these as the absolute starting point for determining 
economic reality, (d) but rather, starting with the scientific method, draws 
from all disciplines as relevant when analyzing law-related economic 
issues in particular contexts, and (e) is both value- and paradigm-conscious;5 
therefore, to understand and communicate economic considerations, the 
rules of professional responsibility call for lawyers and law teachers to 
take a socioeconomic approach to law-related economic issues.6  If 
valid, this proposition should inform professional responsibilities related 
to law practice and teaching in any context in which economic issues 
have substantial legal significance. 
The call for a socioeconomic approach is admittedly aspirational.  No 
one will be disciplined for not approaching law-related issues from a 
socioeconomic perspective.  Professors’ academic freedom should not be 
threatened if they insist on an exclusively neoclassical approach to law-
related economic issues.  Aspirational professional responsibilities are a 
matter of conscience.  Nevertheless, because it is in harmony with good 
lawyering, once it is understood in context, the call for a socioeconomic 
approach may have the effect of changing the way law-related economic 
issues are taught.  The sections that follow discuss in greater detail specific 
professional responsibilities regarding law-related economic issues. 
 
 3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 2.1, 3.3 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (2002).  4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 5; id. R. 6.1(a)(3); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25. 
 5. See Ashford, supra note 2, at 7.  6. This thesis is set forth in greater detail in Ashford, supra note 1, at 611. 
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B.  Competence Regarding Law-Related Economic Issues 
Competence generally requires lawyers to understand the applicability 
of laws, rules, precedents, and policies in context.  The idea that 
competence calls for a socioeconomic foundation for addressing economic 
issues stems from the recognition that, compared to the socioeconomic 
approach, the neoclassical economic approach that presently serves as 
the foundation for mainstream law and economics provides only a small 
part of the analysis necessary to understand law-related economic issues 
in context.  According to The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, a 
widely accepted economic authority, “a large volume of work . . . 
suggests that [the neoclassical assumption of] perfect competition 
corresponds to an extremely special, limiting case of a more general 
theory of markets” and that “no important market fully satisfies the 
conditions of perfect competition and that most would not appear even to 
come close.”7  Furthermore, “the received theory of perfect competition is a 
theory of price competition that contains no coherent explanation of 
price formation.  That such a fundamental incompleteness does not 
severely limit the value of the theory is striking.”8 
Discussing the neoclassical foundation of economic theory, economist 
Robert Solo has eloquently stated the following: 
   The [neoclassical] economics paradigm traces an isle of the solvable in a sea of the inexplicable.  It cannot account for, explain or predict a host of economic phenomena and events.  With its assumption of rational, self seeking individualized choice it leaves out of account the economic consequences of variations in attitude, value, culture and ideology, or variation in the institutional context of choice, or class struggle and collective behavior. . . .    In some instances theories, even whole schools of thought have developed outside the paradigm to explain the effects on economic phenomena and events of these excluded variables.  Thus the Institutionalist School of John R. Commons brings into account the effects of the law as the context of transaction in the determination of economic event.9 
Indeed, since the foundational work of John R. Commons,10 inadequacies 
of neoclassical economics have led to the emergence of a wide array of 
approaches within economics and beyond, including Austrian, behavioral, 
binary, ecological, feminist, humanistic, institutional, Keynesian, post-
 
 7. 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 837–38 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).  8. Id. (quoting the entry, “perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets”).  9. ROBERT A. SOLO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS 42 (1991). 
 10. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1968). 
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Keynesian, and social economics.  More recently, an approach consistent 
with socioeconomics called contextual economics has been advanced by 
thoughtful economists.11  All of these approaches dispute, on positive, factual 
grounds, primary or exclusive reliance on the neoclassical paradigm as 
the foundation for addressing economic issues.  Moreover, most of these 
broader approaches within economics increasingly have found it necessary 
to draw upon other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, political 
science, anthropology, philosophy, history, and law, to describe, analyze, 
and predict economic phenomena and to address economic issues.  
Likewise, increasingly in recent years, reformers of mainstream law and 
economics have broadened their approach to include some of the 
methodologies and perspectives from these disparate approaches, but the 
neoclassical approach generally remains as the foundational starting 
point of their analysis. 
No doubt some proponents of the neoclassical approach to law and 
economics will take some comfort in the continuation in the New 
Palgrave entry, which reads as follows: 
In the competition between economic [market] models, the theory of perfect competition holds a dominant market share: no set of ideas is so widely and successfully used by economists as is the logic of perfectly competitive markets. . . .  [A]ll other market models . . . are little more than fringe competitors.12 
The entry concludes that the dominance of perfect competition theory 
is not the result of its strength, but rather “a reflection of the weakness of 
imperfectly competitive analysis.  There is in fact no powerful general 
theory of imperfect competition.”13  However satisfying this may be to 
some economists and law teachers, it is hardly a ringing endorsement for 
an economic paradigm from the perspective of lawyers who take 
seriously the professional responsibility to get facts right or from the 
perspective of practitioners of any discipline that respects the scientific 
method. 
In fact, every one of the assumptions underlying the neoclassical 
paradigm can be brought into question.  Indeed, there is evidence that (1) 
people do not behave rationally according to the definitions of rational 
 
 11. NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., MICROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2004). Economics is the study of the kinds of social organization by which people provide for the sustaining of life, and enhance the quality of life.  The four essential economic activities are resource maintenance and the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.  Economists study how these activities are undertaken by individuals, and how their social coordination is achieved. 
Id. 
 12. See 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 837. 
 13. Id. at 838. 
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behavior extant in neoclassical economics (specifically the axioms of 
revealed preference as laid out by Paul Samuelson),14 (2) people do not 
act only with self-interest, (3) income distribution is not in accordance 
with the marginal productivity theory of income distribution under 
conditions of perfect competition, (4) preferences are not entirely 
exogenous, (5) race, sex, and nature cannot be ignored or encapsulated 
within the market, and (6) the best starting point for economic analysis is 
not one that considers essentially or nearly factually accurate the 
existence of perfect competition because the conditions necessary for 
perfect competition, including no barriers to market entry, perfect 
knowledge, zero transactions costs, no problems with externalities, and 
other conditions necessary for perfect neoclassical efficiency are not 
satisfied in any important market in any major economy.15 
 
 14. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90–92 (enlarged ed. 1983).  15. In what Paul Samuelson dubbed “the F-twist,” Milton Friedman has dismissed the objections to the unreality of the assumptions of neoclassical economics by arguing that the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are descriptively of “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand.  And this question can be answered by seeing whether the theory . . . yields sufficiently accurate predictions. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953), reprinted in APPRAISAL AND CRITICISM IN ECONOMICS: A BOOK OF READINGS 138, 150 (Bruce J. Caldwell ed., 1984).  However, Friedman’s defense of the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics (which is known as instrumentalism) is itself very controversial among economists.  First, on the issue of predictive power, many economists, such as Robert Solo and Steve Keen, conclude that neoclassical economics is a poor predictor of actual events.  Moreover, economists and philosophers have noted that Friedman’s instrumentalism confuses negligibility assumptions (which may conflict with reality without undermining the applicability of a theory) and domain assumptions (which may not).  See, e.g., Alan Musgrave, “Unreal Assumptions” in 
Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted, 34 KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 377  (1981), reprinted in APPRAISAL AND CRITICISM IN ECONOMICS: A BOOK OF READINGS, 
supra, at 234, 235–39.  Professor Musgrave explains that there are three kinds of assumptions: (1) negligibility assumptions, such as the assumption that in predicting the fall of a ball bearing to earth, the air resistance can be assumed to be negligible; (2) domain assumptions, which specify the conditions under which a theory will apply—if those conditions do not apply, then neither does the theory; and (3) heuristic assumptions, which are known to be false but which are made to simplify the analysis as a first step to a more general theory, and later abandoned when the more general theory is fully formulated.  Id.  According to Drs. Musgrave and Keen, the assumptions underlying neoclassical economics are domain assumptions, which means that because the assumptions contradict reality, the domain of applicability of neoclassical economics is “nowhere.”  STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS: THE NAKED EMPEROR OF THE 
ASHFORD TWO.DOC 9/17/2019  4:15 PM 
 
140 
Thus economists are sharply divided as to whether it is sound in many 
contexts to begin with a foundation grounded in assumptions of perfect 
efficiency, and many economists believe that it is misleading to do so.16  
Neoclassical economics competes not only with market models of imperfect 
competition but also with other approaches to economic phenomena that 
include (in addition to markets) other institutions and disciplines, 
command structures, values, and a richer understanding of human beings.17 
In an excellent article, Institutional Law and Economics, economist A. 
Allan Schmid exposes many of the positive deficiencies of law and 
neoclassical economics and offers a positive alternative institutional law 
and economic approach that has historical roots in the work of John R. 
Commons.18  Many other economists share similar views.19  Some of the 
troublesome inadequacies of limiting law and economics to the 
neoclassical approach will be explored further in Part III. 
Competence requires lawyers to begin with the right foundational 
starting point.  Because economics is divided on the efficacy of the 
neoclassical paradigm, law and economic analysis must start with a 
foundation that is respectful of that diversity of opinion.  In law, the 
competent application of a particular approach in context requires a 
proper foundation for doing so; one on which the weaknesses and 
limitations in the approach can be evaluated and on which other relevant 
ways of looking at the issues at hand can also be considered.  Thus, legal 
competence regarding law-related economic issues does not require a 
rejection of the neoclassical paradigm.  Rather, competence requires 
lawyers to begin their analysis with a foundation that (1) recognizes that 
the applicability and probity of the neoclassical approach depends on 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 149–64 (2001).  16. Peter Monaghan, Taking on “Rational Man,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 24, 2003, at A12.  Speaking of “neoclassical economics, which is based on such concepts as rational choice, the market, and economies’ tendency to move toward equilibrium,” Mr. Monaghan writes: “Despite the power of the orthodoxy, the naysayers are numerous.  While the American Economic Association has some 22,000 members, the 30-odd groups under the umbrella of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics have American memberships totaling more than 5,000.”  Id. 
 17. See generally ROBERT A. SOLO, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (Univ. of Mich. Press 2000) (1967) (proposing a change of the neoclassical economic paradigm through an examination of several different forms of economic organization, the national economy, as well as social systems and economic development).  This book, which is endorsed by Richard Hattwick, the founding editor of the Journal of Socio-Economics, as the best text by an economist on the essence of socioeconomics, was republished by the University of Michigan Press in part because of the growing interest in socioeconomics among law teachers.  18. A. Allan Schmid, Institutional Law and Economics, 1 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 33 (1994).  19. For example, Paul Davidson, Matthew Forstater, Warren Samuels, Robert Solo, Harry Trebing, Charles Whalen, Randall Wray, and Edward Wolff. 
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context, (2) takes into account its weaknesses and limitations, and (3) is 
also receptive in an even-handed manner to other approaches that 
explain phenomena in different ways.  In some contexts, microeconomic 
principles may tell the whole story of socioeconomic effect; in other 
contexts other schools of economics, other disciplines, and even whole 
new ways of thinking may be required.  For these reasons, and for the  
additional reasons set forth below, competence requires socioeconomics 
rather than neoclassical economics as the foundational starting point for 
analyzing law-related economic issues in context.20 
C.  Candor Regarding Law-Related Economic Issues 
The duty of candor regarding economic issues is not more lax than the 
duty applied to other issues.  In the course of legal representation, 
attorneys may not knowingly make false statements of material fact or 
law to courts and others.  In the absence of limitations on disclosure 
arising from considerations such as client confidences, attorney work 
product, and constitutional rights, when an attorney speaks or writes, 
knowing omissions that are materially misleading are no more excusable 
than lies.  In the course of teaching law, no looser standard should be 
applied to law teachers.  The duty of candor in teaching might be called 
the duty to teach with full disclosure.  Although applicable in a different 
context, the spirit of the ethic of teaching with full disclosure is revealed 
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct at rules 3.3(a)(1) and (3), 
3.3(d),  and 4.121 and in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
at DR 7-102 and DR 7-106(B)(2).22  When appearing before a judge in 
 
 20. An excellent book presenting many of the strengths and weaknesses of neoclassical economics in context is KEEN, supra note 15.  21. Model Rule 3.3(a) provides in part, “A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal” and “(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2001).  Model Rule 3.3(d) provides, “In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.”  Id. R. 3.3(d) (emphasis added).  Model Rule 4.1 provides in part, “In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . .”  Id. R. 4.1.  22. Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 provides in part, “(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (2002).  Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-106 (B)(2) provides in part, “In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose: (1) [l]egal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly 
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an Illinois court, for example, if a lawyer represents that the case law of 
California holds A, knowing in fact that the California appellate courts 
are divided on the issue, with one holding A, another holding B, and a 
third holding not-A, while knowing that there is no holding from the 
California Supreme Court that resolves the conflict in opinions, that 
lawyer has committed an ethical violation. 
To represent to students that neoclassical economics speaks for all of 
economics raises analogous ethical considerations.  Whether the advancement 
of a particular economic paradigm that rests on undisclosed controversy 
materially relevant to law is considered, the advancement of facts (or 
rather rules for determining facts), the need for full disclosure to students 
(who generally have minimal training in economics and factfinding and 
who entrust their attention in reliance of basic fair play in the teaching 
process) is at least as strong as the need to protect judges (who are well-
trained in the law and factfinding) from  misstatements or inadequate 
disclosure regarding the facts and law.  Moreover, without one or more 
other teachers in the classroom to represent alternative relevant points of 
view, the ethical requirements regarding disclosure should, by analogy, 
be informed by rule 3.3(d) governing ex parte proceedings, under which 
there is the obligation to advance all considerations relevant to the 
deliberations and judgments that are to be made.23  Following the rise 
and decline of the original law and economics movement that began 
largely with the work of John R. Commons and flourished in American 
law schools from the 1930s through the 1950s,24 the present-day so-
called law and economics movement that emerged after the McCarthy 
era (and that has since flourished with increasing prominence with 
substantial funding from institutions with particular economic agendas) 
can accurately be called law and neoclassical economics; but to refer to 
it as law and economics is not substantively accurate.25  Charitably, to 
pass off law and neoclassical economics for law and economics can be 
called a misnomer and, less charitably, can be called deceptive labeling. 
Neoclassical economics is not all there is to economics.  A 
 
adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.”  Id. DR 7-106 (footnotes omitted).  23. Model Rule 3.3(d) provides, “In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (emphasis added). 
 24. See Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and 
Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 95 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).  25. For what might be the first explicit recognition in scholarship of the fact that what passes for law and economics is in reality law and neoclassical economics, see James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the 
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW  HIST. REV. 275, 275–77 (1997). 
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comparison of basic texts used to teach economics in law schools and 
economics departments proves that what passes for authoritative 
positivism as a matter of economic theory in the basic texts of law and 
economics does not pass muster as fact in the departments of 
economics.26  Even with the substantial funding from institutions with 
particular economic perspectives, it is not entirely clear that the 
contemporary so-called law and economics movement would have 
spread so rapidly and influenced the law school curriculum so 
pervasively if it were required to be labeled “law and neoclassical 
economics.”  Nevertheless, students frequently are falsely taught that 
neoclassical economics speaks authoritatively for all economics when it 
does not.  Moreover, even if correctly labeled “law and neoclassical 
economics,” such courses generally fail to reveal to law students the 
complexities, known to many economists, that deprive neoclassical 
analysis of its supposed predictive power and its ability to guide legal 
policy so as to achieve unambiguous, value-free wealth maximization.27  
Thus, in a course in law and neoclassical economics it would seem 
appropriate and balanced to teach only neoclassical principles (preferably 
with the full disclosure of their limitations), but in a course in law and 
economics, candor would seem to call for a broader approach that 
reflects the full richness and diversity of analysis contained in the 
discipline of economics. 
D.  The Duty to Improve the Law 
The socioeconomic approach to the competence and candor 
requirements of a lawyer’s professional responsibility has an important 
bearing on the lawyer’s duty to improve the law.  Lawyers have the 
responsibility not only to represent clients with competence and candor 
within the bounds of existing law, but also to discover ways to improve 
the law, not only for the benefit of clients but also, beyond and apart 
from client interests, for the benefit of society.28  This duty exists not 
 
 26. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003) (using an efficiency ethic of neoclassical economic principles as the basis for the seminal text on law and economics), with PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (13th ed. 1989) (presenting an introduction to economic theory that suggests moving beyond the complacency of mainstream or neoclassical economics, which may be dull and essentially incorrect). 
 27. See KEEN, supra note 15, at 10.  28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 5; id. R. 6.1(a)(3); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (2002). 
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only with respect to the rules of professional responsibility, but in all 
areas of law practice and in virtually all subjects taught in law school.  
Fulfilling the duty to improve the law requires an understanding of how 
law changes.  It also requires a rigorous understanding of the intellectual 
and institutional barriers and resistance to change.  Law schools and 
teachers play an important part in the process of reforming the law and 
defending the status quo.  The scholarship they produce is used both to  
support law reform and to fortify resistance to law reform on behalf of 
clients and others.  In supporting changes in the law and resistance to 
change, advocates use and advance theories and evidence related to 
those theories.  When doing their part to improve the law, practitioners 
and teachers are ethically required to act responsibly regarding the 
theories and evidence they advance.  The barriers and resistance to 
reform are frequently fortified by unexamined assumptions and logic of 
accepted theories.  This is certainly true in economics.29  If theories 
exclusively or primarily based on neoclassical economics are incomplete 
or inaccurate, and therefore misleading, they must be balanced, supplemented, 
and even replaced if by reason of logic, empirical evidence, or other 
appropriate standard they fail to provide the foundation needed for 
understanding and promoting beneficial change. 
E.  Assisting Clients and Others to Gain Competence Regarding             
Law-Related Economic Issues 
If lawyers know or can reasonably be expected to learn to identify what 
understanding their clients lack—understanding that might aid or hinder 
their cause—lawyers have the duty to supply it to clients either 
directly by instruction30 or indirectly by securing the expertise of others 
to supply it.31  In this context, the relationship of the lawyer to the client 
is very much like the relationship of the teacher to the student.  If clients, 
students, and others are to participate effectively in the process of law 
reform, they need informed understanding.  Some will benefit from a 
fuller understanding of the theories, including economic and competing 
 
 29. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST 
AND MONEY viii (1936).  In the preface to his General Theory, Keynes writes the following: “The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely simple and should be obvious.  The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.”  Id.  30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”). 
 31. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (“Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.”). 
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theories, that shape the law.  This understanding is necessary to preserve 
client autonomy and to enhance individual participation in the 
democratic process.  The role of candor here helps to fulfill lawyers’ 
vital connection to the preservation of individual autonomy and the 
maintenance of democratic participation in governmental processes.32 
Depending on their understanding of (1) the real consequences of 
legal action and proposed law reform, (2) the barriers to legal action and 
reform, and (3) the true realm of other possibilities revealed by other 
paradigms of understanding, people’s responses and demands will be 
realistic or unrealistic, well- or ill-suited to their interests, and pursued 
with comprehension or confusion.  People’s interests in legal action and 
their appetites for law reform depend on their understanding of the 
system and the processes of change.  An economic theory offered to shape 
and justify the law and law reform will gain acceptance and win trust if 
it provides a coherent explanation as to how individuals and their rights 
and responsibilities fit into the entire picture.  Understanding the entire 
law and economic picture, and one’s (and everyone’s) place in it, requires 
more than a neoclassical perspective, more than a broader economic 
perspective generally recognized by university professors of economics, 
and more than economics augmented by just one or two other 
disciplines.  It requires a socioeconomic approach. 
III.   POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE DEFICIENCIES OF PASSING OFF 
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS FOR ECONOMICS WHEN                               
TEACHING “LAW AND ECONOMICS” 
A.  Introduction 
Teaching “the economic analysis of law” (commonly referred to as 
law and economics) based exclusively, foundationally, or primarily on 
principles of neoclassical economics gives rise to serious positive and 
normative deficiencies.  Some of these have been explored extensively 
in legal and economic scholarship;33 several others have gone largely 
 
 32. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. & prelim. statement (2002).  33. Many of the deficiencies of law and neoclassical economics are discussed by economist A. Allan Schmid, in Schmid, supra note18.  Professor Schmid makes an excellent case for a broader approach to law and economics under the name of institutional law and economics.  In the area of legal scholarship, consider the work of Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of 
the Concept of “The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency”: Why the 
Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare 
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unnoticed.  To put in context the positive and normative deficiencies of 
approaching a course, course segment, or subject labeled “law and 
economics” from a neoclassical rather than a socioeconomic perspective, 
consider four individuals: Anne, Bruce, Daphne, and Clark.  Anne is a partner 
in a prestigious Wall Street law firm.  Her clients consist of a diversified 
portfolio of America’s three thousand largest creditworthy companies.  
Bruce is a public interest lawyer who represents poor and working 
people, some but not all of whom qualify for legal aid.  Daphne is a 
federal government attorney in an agency charged with promoting 
national economic welfare.  Clark is a law professor whose students will 
eventually join Anne, Bruce, Daphne, and Clark as professional colleagues.  
All four take seriously the ethical precepts discussed above, including 
the duty to improve the law for the benefit of clients and society.  None 
earned degrees in economics, but all believe that the connection between 
law and economics has an important bearing on serving clients, improving 
the law, and educating lawyers.  The question they are considering is the 
following: What understanding should they derive from economics, 
either by way of learning or by relying on experts, to guide them in their 
professional activities? 
Without an empirical study of the way law and economics is actually 
taught in courses, course segments, and subject matter offered under that 
name, this Part takes as a proxy Economic Analysis of Law by Judge 
Richard A. Posner.34  Economic Analysis of Law is a book that has been 
adopted by many law teachers to teach law and economics and has been 
cited in much legal scholarship on the subject.  Judge Posner advances a 
promising rationale for a course labeled “law and economics,” but that is 
essentially limited to law and neoclassical economics.  According to Judge 
Posner, an “efficiency ethic” based on neoclassical economic principles 
is (1) descriptive of the common law, (2) useful to the understanding of 
both (a) the law and (b) the economic effects of law, and (3) especially 
helpful in maximizing the societal wealth of an economy if its laws are 
structured according to neoclassical  economic principles.35  If neoclassical 
economic principles serve in this way in a specific course called law and 
economics, then it is easy to perceive important benefits to be derived from 
including neoclassical economic principles in other courses throughout the 
curriculum, in scholarship, and in efforts to improve the law.  According 
to Judge Posner’s approach, so strong is the descriptive and wealth-
 
Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485.  For a scholarly, historical analysis of the legal scholarship, see James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics 
Theory: A Critical History of the Distribution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361 (2003).  34. POSNER, supra note 26. 
 35. Id. at 249–53. 
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enhancing promise of neoclassical economics that it is offered as a 
means of unifying disparate basic courses such as contracts, property, 
torts, and criminal law and advanced law courses by reconceptualizing 
them in terms of the neoclassical paradigm.  However, it is doubtful that 
this neoclassical reconceptualization can be accepted without changing 
the substance of past decisions and the direction of future decisions. 
Moreover, in a course on law and economics, if the neoclassical 
approach to law and economics is selective, incomplete, and taught in 
such a way as to exclude, obscure, and misrepresent positive law-related 
economic phenomena that call into question the wealth-maximizing 
promise of neoclassical economics, then the positive benefits promised 
by the neoclassical approach, and the propriety of passing off the 
neoclassical approach as the sole economic theory or as speaking for all 
economics, are seriously drawn into question.36 
It is also significant to note that, if accepted, Judge Posner’s approach 
to law and economics has the effect of framing the analysis of many of 
the issues and interests of clients and students regarding law-related 
economic issues in a particular way.  If the wealth-maximizing promise 
of structuring the common law and other law on neoclassical principles 
is accepted as the positive starting point for predicting and achieving 
societal wealth maximization, then (according to Judge Posner) the goal 
of “distributively neutral” wealth maximization can be contrasted with 
and balanced against all other “competing values” of distribution and 
justice.  The debate is thus framed as wealth maximization versus 
competing values.37 
It is neither good lawyering nor good socioeconomics, however, to 
accept this characterization without considering other positive arguments 
that (1) are an essential part of contemporary economic understanding, 
(2) draw into question the promised connection between microeconomic 
efficiency and societal wealth maximization, (3) offer alternative positive 
approaches to wealth maximization, and (4) reveal that Judge Posner’s 
approach to law and economics is not distributively neutral. 
According to the socioeconomic approach, if wealth maximization is a 
 
 36. This Article takes primary issue with the claim that structuring common law decisions and other legal policy according to neoclassical principles is wealth-maximizing.  Whether such a strategy is actually descriptive of common law decisionmaking is left for another day.  Also left for another day are normative arguments against the efficiency ethic, which are a frequent subject of  legal scholarship.  37. POSNER, supra note 26, at 252. 
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major goal of teaching law and economics, then as a positive matter of 
economics, primary reliance on the neoclassical approach without a 
foundation receptive to a broader understanding of economics and other 
disciplines is a problematic approach resting on a dubious foundation.  
Passing off law and neoclassical economics as law and economics 
ignores important positive controversies in economics and other relevant 
disciplines regarding (1) the application of neoclassical economic theory 
in context, (2) the macroeconomic effect of legal policy based on neoclassical 
theory, and (3) the macroeconomic operation of the economy.38 
Although Judge Posner assures students that the promised connection 
between efficiency and growth (wealth maximization) is “rather 
 
 38. Exclusive or primary reliance on neoclassical economics in law schools and to a lesser extent in graduate schools of economics and by practicing economists in governmental agencies and businesses tends to ignore or unduly minimize the import of well-established literature on major and important issues related to monopoly power, international trade, the environment and sustainability, wealth and income distribution, legal structure, institutional environment, and human behavior.  See generally CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997) (arguing that the market may not be the model arrangement for the management of economic activity); HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1996) (arguing that the concept of sustainable growth is being interpreted and used in ways that are not only wrong, but also potentially dangerous); HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING 
THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2d ed. 1994) (demonstrating how neoclassical economics and reliance on an industrial economy focused on growth ultimately lead to environmental disaster and how this might be rectified); MARK A. LUTZ & KENNETH LUX, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISTIC ECONOMICS (1979) (using Maslow’s hierarchy of wants to argue that western notions of capitalism are not morally defensible and that humanistic adjustments are required to increase economic welfare); HUGH SCHWARTZ, RATIONALITY GONE AWRY?: DECISION MAKING INCONSISTENT WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY (1998) (investigating the increasing evidence of economic irregularity based on traditional economic theory and arguing for a broad behavioral structure for economics and investment); SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF ACCUMULATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH AND CRISIS (David M. Kotz et al. eds., 1994) (examining the economies of Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, and the United States in order to explain the success or failure of economies based on the influence of political and economic institutions); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (discussing both the positive and negative aspects of globalization); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (questioning the neoclassical economic assumption that man is motivated purely by self-interest); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987) (arguing that economic rationality forms only a part of the premises in economic reasoning and calling for an empirically founded theory of choice); Harry M. Trebing, Market Failure in Public Utility Industries: An Institutionalist Critique of 
Deregulation, in INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 287 (Marc R. Tool & Paul Dale Bush eds., 2003) (arguing that the neoclassical approach is unrealistic when applied to real-world utility markets); Harry M. Trebing, New Dimensions of Market 
Failure in Electricity and Natural Gas Supply, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 395 (2001) (discussing the institutional view of market failure and the use of market power by analyzing California’s electricity and natural gas shortages). 
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uncontroversial,”39 the neoclassical economic approach advanced to students 
ignores widespread economic controversy based on contributions that 
John Maynard Keynes (who receives not so much as a mention in Judge 
Posner’s book), Nobel Prize winners in economics, and other able 
economists have made to economic theory and practice, contributions 
that shape the law and economic policy of every so-called free market 
economy in the world.  Thus, passing off law and neoclassical economics 
for law and economics has had the effect of misinforming several 
generations of law students (many of whom have become law professors, 
and many more who have beome lawyers) by ignoring other approaches 
to economics that students need to understand in order to put the wealth-
maximizing claims of law and neoclassical economics in accurate 
perspective and to understand the full scope of issues related to wealth 
maximization. 
B.  Some Problems with Passing Off Neoclassical                              
Economics as Economics 
In light of lawyers’ professional responsibility to serve clients and of 
law teachers’ professional responsibility to teach students, a number of 
important deficiencies result from passing off the neoclassical approach 
to economics as the only approach to law and economics.  Specifically, 
passing off law and neoclassical economics for law and economics (1) 
confuses a microeconomic theory of efficiency with wealth maximization 
and growth, (2) fails to address the persistence of unutilized productive 
capacity, (3) fails to acknowledge positive controversies regarding 
neoclassical principles and their application in context, and (4) falsely 
teaches that the noteworthy major controversies regarding the neoclassical 
approach relevant to law are all value-based and do not include fact-
based controversies relative to efficiency and wealth maximization.  
Each of these points is discussed in turn below. 
 
 39. POSNER, supra note 26, at 253. 
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1.  Neoclassical Efficiency Theory Is Not a General Growth                  
Theory of  Wealth Maximization 
Perhaps the most serious and pervasive, but least recognized, false 
impression resulting from passing off neoclassical economics for 
economics is the widespread confusion that results from treating the 
theory of neoclassical efficiency as though it were synonymous with a 
comprehensive theory of societal wealth maximization or growth.  In 
advancing his neoclassical approach to the analysis of law, for example, 
Judge Posner states, “What Adam Smith referred to as a nation’s wealth, 
what this book refers to as efficiency, and what a layman might call the 
size of the pie, has always been an important social value . . . .”40  Judge 
Posner compounds his error by declaring that the connection between 
efficiency and growth is “uncontroversial.”41 
As a matter of positive economics, however, efficiency and growth are 
quite distinct concepts.  Microeconomic efficiency is not a general 
theory of growth or wealth maximization, which was the focus of Adam 
Smith.  In a shrinking, dying economy, every transaction might be 
neoclassically efficient, and various conceptions of efficiency (whether 
as defined by Marshall, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, or others) could be, 
nevertheless, invariably satisfied.  In fact, neoclassical efficiency, even 
when positively related to growth and wealth maximization, is only one 
component of a much more complicated dynamic process that requires a 
broader approach to economics along with other disciplines to 
comprehend. 
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution and increasingly so ever 
 
 40. Id. at 252.  Judge Posner offers no theory for the relationship between economic principles and wealth maximization growth other than those neoclassical principles based on allocative efficiency.  In many contexts, Judge Posner equates efficiency with wealth maximization.  For example, in discussing the moral content of the common law, Judge Posner declares, “Efficiency or wealth maximization is an important thread in the ethical tapestry [of the common law], but it is not the only one.”  Id. at 265.  This false impression is promoted by many others.  For example, other economists have argued that  what is socially optimal under any measure of social welfare is for the net amount of pie produced to be as large as possible—this is efficiency—and then for the pie to be sliced up and distributed in a way that is best according to the particular measure of social welfare under consideration. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 369 (2003).  41. POSNER, supra note 26, at 253.  Judge Posner also states the following: The rate of economic growth is the rate at which the output of a society increases.  Since growth is fostered by using resources more efficiently, there is a sense, but a rather uncontroversial one, in which the common law, insofar as it is shaped by a concern with efficiency, may be said to have fostered growth. 
Id. at 252. 
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since, technology brings forth vast increases in productive capacity that 
are not primarily the result of the gains promised by marginal efficiency.  
For example, the great gains in wealth experienced in the United States 
since the 1850s are not continuous increments driven by marginal prices 
with causes rooted in constant technology and short time frames (which 
are the domain of neoclassical economics).  Rather, these are discontinuous, 
sometimes explosively large changes in productive capacity and the 
distribution of demand with causes rooted in technological progress and 
capital investment, subject to limited competition, aided by government 
allocation and the protection of property rights. 
Major breakthroughs in productive capacity occasioning great increases 
in wealth are not primarily the result of efficiency gains at the margin.  
In the corporate context, for example, major corporations flourish or fail 
in the surplus generated long before market prices of their factor inputs 
and products approach efficient equilibrium.  In this context, corporate 
wealth maximization requires maximizing both (1) “normal profits” 
(those earned in perfectly competitive markets) and (2) “abnormal 
profits” (those earned in the context of substantial technological 
advances and other conditions of imperfect efficiency).42 
The major elements in economic growth observed in market economies 
experiencing substantial growth occur when relevant markets are far 
from achieving perfect efficiency, when prices are far from the theoretical 
equilibrium, and when any growth effects of relatively efficient resource 
allocation are comparatively low or even negative.  This is not to say that 
efficiency is not an important consideration in wealth-maximizing 
analysis, but it does not play the unambiguous role in wealth 
maximization that neoclassical law and economics ascribes to it.43 
Nevertheless, the principles of neoclassical efficiency are widely and 
loosely advanced by those who pass off law and neoclassical economics 
as the sole theory of law and economics and as a de facto theory of 
 
 42. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1934) (describing an economic theory of growth based on technological development).  While Schumpeter developed a powerful analysis of the real-world process of growth, the analysis does not form any part of the neoclassical paradigm.  It is therefore another instance where the socioeconomic approach to law is more realistic than the so-called law and economics approach.  43. “Mr. [Steve] Keen, an economist at Australia’s University of Western Sydney, says he objects to neoclassical economics because ‘it makes capitalism a worse system than it would otherwise be, and makes it function less well as a generator of wealth and innovation.’”  Monaghan, supra note 16, at A12. 
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causation regarding growth and wealth maximization.44  Analysis largely 
limited to such constructs as Pareto optimality, Edgeworth boxes, and 
rational choice theory confuse marginal gains with wealth maximization 
and ignore the effect of the distribution of wealth, opportunities, risks, 
and uncertainties45 that can greatly affect wealth maximization and 
distribution over time in ways not comprehended by marginal efficiency 
analysis. 
The pervasive and continuing confusion between the neoclassical 
promise of “efficiency maximization” with the broader question of 
economic growth and societal wealth maximization is clearly revealed 
by Judge Posner’s defense of the neoclassical benefits of “more or less” 
free markets advanced in The Problems of Jurisprudence, when he 
declared the following: 
[I]n general people who live in societies in which markets are allowed to function more or less freely not only are wealthier than people in other societies but have more political rights, more liberty and dignity, are more content (as evidenced, for example, by their being less prone to emigrate)—so that wealth maximization may be the most direct route to a variety of moral ends.46 
Socioeconomists question Judge Posner’s unsubstantiated assumptions 
that the theory of neoclassical efficiency and strict legal adherence to its 
precepts (1) establish or invariably enhance the necessary conditions for 
competitive markets and (2) are respectively the primary explanation 
and the main cause of the per capita economic growth and greater wealth 
that can be observed. 
One of the worst ways in which to serve a client is to focus on a less 
important aspect of a problem at the expense of neglecting a more 
important aspect as a result of either failing to identify or diverting 
attention from the more important aspect.  The neoclassical preoccupation 
with and emphasis on efficiency as the sole or primary cause of wealth 
maximization and growth does just that.  Professional competence 
requires lawyers to accurately distinguish between the more important 
and the less important and to devote their efforts (and if necessary 
instruct their clients) consistent with the priorities revealed by that 
distinction. 
 
 44. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 369.  45. For an important distinction between risk and uncertainty that neoclassical market theory tends to ignore, see KEEN, supra note 15, at 200–02.  46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990). 
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2.  Neoclassical Economics Fails to Address Unutilized                    
Productive Capacity 
Another major problem with passing off law and neoclassical 
economics as the sole theory of law and economics is that it ignores the 
phenomenon of persistent (and, many would say, growing) unutilized 
productive capacity (including unemployed and underemployed workers) in 
the context of supposedly increasingly competitive markets.  By failing 
to draw attention to the existence of unutilized productive capacity, 
those who teach law and neoclassical economics as law and economics 
according to the approach of Judge Posner fail to inform their students of 
one of the greatest economic problems (important to clients) that 
neoclassical theory fails to address. 
Thus, if asked to determine the facts, the general counsel of most 
prime creditworthy companies would (after completing the due diligence 
of consulting with all appropriate experts) conclude that their companies 
(even as they determine that the immediate need to effect major 
downsizings, plant closings, and layoffs) owned the productive capacity 
(with available capital assets and labor) to profitably increase output by 
perhaps ten to twenty percent if there were only customers with money 
to buy what could be readily produced at even lower unit costs.  This 
would apply not only to consumer goods, but also to producer goods, so 
that within existing unutilized productive capacity, there is the capacity 
to create even more unutilized productive capacity.  If some measure of 
that unutilized productive capacity could be profitably employed, corporate 
profits and shareholder wealth would increase accordingly.  The question 
for the corporate fiduciary (including the corporate lawyer) is the 
following: What economic, financial, engineering, marketing, ethical, 
political, and legal strategies can be employed to most profitably 
acquire, employ, and dispose of its assets? 
The persistence of unutilized productive capacity is (or should be) also 
a matter of central concern to advocates for the economically disadvantaged, 
the environment, and other worthy causes (including those who favor 
better corporate management and a robust scope for corporate social 
responsibility) and to public servants vested with the responsibility to 
promote national economic welfare.  Unutilized productive capacity of 
an economy’s major corporations means a capacity to provide more 
basic necessities (such as food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and 
health care), more simple comforts and conveniences, by way of greener 
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and more socially responsible industrial processes and practices, as well 
as more employment.  Many threatened plant closings, downsizings, and 
layoffs are reflections of unutilized productive capacity.  Many greener 
ways of producing goods and services that go unutilized are reflections 
of unutilized productive capacity.  Despite neoclassical assumptions of 
diminishing returns, the unused productive capacity is generally marked 
by diminishing unit costs and increasing economies of production made 
unprofitable only by insufficient consumer demand for more production 
even at discount selling prices. 
However, neoclassical economics has little to say about unutilized 
productive capacity.  In the world of perfect neoclassical efficiency, 
unutilized capacity (beyond the need to satisfy peaks in market demand 
and some additional capacity for emergencies beyond the predictable) 
should not exist for long.  But it has.  By scientific standards, persistent 
unutilized productive capacity is an anomaly of major significance 
which belies the neoclassical assumption that markets are efficient or 
nearly efficient. 
Accordingly, as a discipline, economics has long recognized that 
something more than neoclassical economics is necessary to address the 
phenomenon of unutilized productive capacity.  In response to the Great 
Depression, when, unlike present times, the existence of vast unutilized 
productive capacity became a politically undeniable fact that could not 
be ignored, Keynesian economics was introduced as a major element of 
government economic policy in the United States and other Western-
style capitalist economies precisely to deal with the persistence of 
unutilized productive capacity.  As a consequence, since the Great Depression, 
in practical effect, present law and economic policy in all of the world’s 
major so-called market economies is a mixed compromise of classical, 
neoclassical, and Keynesian theory and practice. 
According to Keynesian economics, there is a systemic market failure 
that belies the neoclassical assumptions of perfect efficiency; untapped 
growth potential, unutilized productive capacity, underemployment of 
labor, and suboptimal allocation of resources persist despite classical and 
neoclassical economic theory to the contrary.  Markets are far from 
perfectly competitive, and their operation results in a persistent shortfall 
in “effective demand” for consumption, employment, and investment.  
The result is an endemic underutilization of resources that can be at least 
partially corrected by government action. 
Accordingly, in light of persistent unutilized productive capacity, if 
increasing the size of the pie is a goal of using principles of economics 
to guide the legal system, then a competent, lawyerly approach to 
economic issues needs more than neoclassical economics to shape legal 
policy.  As taught in law schools, law and economics should not begin 
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and end with neoclassical economic analysis, but must begin with a 
foundation broad enough to accommodate at least the insights provided 
by Keynesian and other economic approaches that recognize the reality 
of unutilized capacity, including willing but unemployed workers whose 
preferences are not adequately reflected in microeconomic demand 
curves. 
3.  The Neoclassical Preoccupation with Efficiency Maximization that 
Results from Passing Off Neoclassical Economics for Economics               
Fails to Acknowledge Fairly Major Positive Controversies                 
Regarding the Principles and Application of Neoclassical                 
Economics in Context 
In addition to the foregoing deficiencies in the neoclassical approach 
to law and economics, a number of other positive controversies frequently 
discussed in literature are minimized or ignored by Judge Posner’s 
approach to law and economics.47  Several are addressed below. 
a.  The Efficiency-Maximizing Promise of the Neoclassical Approach to 
Law and Economics Depends on the Extent to Which Efficient             
Markets Exist and Efficient Bargaining Occurs in Fact 
As noted above, analysis of wealth maximization that depends on 
assumptions of perfect efficiency is inherently misleading.  The accuracy 
of the assumption of perfect efficiency requires the prevalence of perfect 
competition in all industries—something that is manifestly not the case 
in reality in any economy in the world. 
In the real economy, inhabited by creditworthy corporate giants, 
markets are full of inefficiencies and path-dependent, suboptimal equilibria; 
transactions costs are substantial; information is imperfect; autonomy is 
limited; rationality is bounded; satisfying rather than maximizing is a 
common practice; collusion, free-riding, shirking, and skimming abound; 
monopolistic practices flourish; major sectors of every so-called free 
market economy are subsidized, regulated, and protected; labor and 
capital markets are regulated and protected; government is a big factor in 
 
 47. Many of the deficiencies of law and neoclassical economics are discussed by economist A. Allan Schmid.  See Schmid, supra note 18, at 37–48.  Although questioning the proliferation of labels regarding the interdisciplinary connection between law and economics, Professor Schmid makes an excellent case for a broader approach to law and economics under the name of  institutional law and economics.  Id. at 33–36. 
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terms of taxing, spending, and controlling credit and money; nonmarket 
relations and forces intervene in the markets to advantage some and 
burden others; capital investment is a variable; and technology is 
dynamically changing and producing unexpected positive and negative 
consequences.  In short, although clearly more efficient than centrally 
controlled economies, the somewhat free market economies of the 
United States and other industrial nations are at best in a state of 
imperfect competition, relative inefficiency, and suboptimal 
employment of available resources.  In the real world of imperfect 
competition, distribution-dependent, relative efficiencies can as easily be 
called relative inefficiencies, because as a positive matter, neither 
economics nor law can determine how far from the conditions of perfect 
efficiency are the conditions inherent in any particular distribution of 
wealth. 
b.  Under Conditions of Imperfect Competition, One Cannot Assume  
that Legal Incentives to Promote Microeconomic Efficiency                           
of Behavior, Transactions, and Classes of Transactions                             
Will Increase, Rather than Decrease, Total Economic                       
Efficiency and Wealth 
In the case of imperfect competition, efficiency gains in one context 
achieved by a particular legal rule may result in greater efficiency losses 
in others.48  Monopolists and oligopolists can capitalize on efficiency 
 
 48. The false notion that microeconomic efficiency will necessarily be reflected in greater overall societal efficiency is a fallacy that most undergraduate students in economics understand as the “compositional fallacy” and which is explored in considerable economic literature as “the theory of second best.”  Tucked away in a footnote, Judge Posner declares that the “empirical significance of this type of problem (the problem of the ‘second best’) is dubious.”  POSNER, supra note 26, at 279 n.1.  But many economists disagree.  See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and 
Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7 (1998) (stating that second-best theory “has critical implications for the proper approach to allocative-efficiency analysis”).  Also consider the following articles by Richard Markovits in favor of the theory: Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy 
Analysis in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the 
Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 950; Markovits, supra note 33; Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second 
Best, and The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1979) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)); Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-
Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World: The Whys and 
Some Therefores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1996); Richard S. Markovits, Second-
Best Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Reply to Professor Donohue, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 267 (1998); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard 
Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological” 
Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993). 
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gains here to destroy otherwise effective competition in another quarter.  
One cannot reliably assume that the formulation of legal policy to 
achieve microeconomic efficiency in a particular context will not 
adversely affect efficiency elsewhere to produce a net decrease in total 
efficiency.49 
c.  Efficiency Is Dependent on Distribution 
Another major misrepresentation that results from passing off neoclassical 
economics as the sole theory of economics is the false notion that 
efficiency maximization has rigorous meaning independent of distribution 
in theory and in fact.  In this regard, recall that the supposedly wealth-
enhancing, allocational benefits of perfectly efficient markets assumes 
that prices will lead to the optimal allocation of resources, labor, production, 
distribution, and consumption.  As a positive matter of economics, however, 
the same logic that holds that prices determine distribution also holds 
that distribution determines prices.  No standard of efficiency is or can 
be distributively neutral.  Even when transactions costs can be assumed 
to be zero and externalities are negligible or nonexistent, the assignment 
of property rights nevertheless affects prices and the allocation of 
resources. 
d.  There Is No One Single Paramount Optimal Efficiency to Guide 
Judge Posner’s Efficiency Ethic of the Common Law, but                          
Many Distribution-Dependent Relative Efficiencies 
The fact that efficiency is dependent on distribution belies a misleading 
supposition of Judge Posner’s approach to law and economics: the false 
proposition that there is a single, determinable, wealth-maximizing standard 
of efficiency (independent of distribution) which can guide the common 
law in its decisionmaking.  In economic theory and fact, there is no 
single paramount optimal efficiency, but rather, many distribution-
dependent relative efficiencies.50 
 
 49. “A rule that is optimal considering all possible events (probability summing to one) is different from one that considers only the event that is the subject of a particular court suit.”  Schmid, supra note 18, at 45.  50. Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian 
Law and Economics as Policy Analysis, 60 TEX. L. REV. 147, 153 (1981) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)) (“[T]here is no unique wealth maximizing result, only results specific to the rights structure that supports the existing distribution of wealth.”); Schmid, supra note 18, at 37. 
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e.  Reliance on the Coase Theorem as the Foundation for Law and 
Economics Is Contrary to Fact and History 
Although widely cited as the twentieth century foundation of law and 
economics, the Coase Theorem51 (the notion that even in the presence of 
externalities, “if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a 
property right will not affect the use of the property”52 because 
bargaining will efficiently allocate not only goods but also costs to 
maximize wealth)53 is not grounded in reality; for example, consider 
negligible transaction costs, voluntary exchange, efficient markets, and 
the irrelevance of initial and consequential wealth distribution by way of 
supposedly voluntary, efficient exchanges.  The law and neoclassical 
economic analysis regarding transactions costs, opportunity costs, and 
externalities, which is used to structure legal rules to facilitate or mimic 
the promised efficiency maximization of the neoclassical approach, 
ignores a number of objections advanced by many economists, including 
the following: (1) “opportunity costs are not independent of law and thus 
cannot instruct the law,”54 (2) “[e]xternalities are ubiquitous, and the 
problem for law is to bring order and predictability as to who can create 
externality for whom (who is the buyer and who is seller of 
opportunities)—not just how to facilitate trade,”55 and (3) “[t]he fact 
 
    Since efficiency is always rooted in some distribution of rights, it can never be a basis for judging that distribution.  Rights are antecedent to efficiency calculations. . . . [I]t is not meaningful to conceptualize policy issues as efficiency versus distribution.  The issue is efficiency 1 versus efficiency 2, each with a different starting place that resolves the question of power. . . .    . . . .    . . . Law affects costs and demand curves, and thus the optimal law is not simply a matter of the analyst finding where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Resource allocation and distribution are empirically interdependent, not matters to be separately determined or traded off. 
Id. at 37, 48 (citation omitted). 
 51. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 378. Curiously, however, after Bentham [1789], the economic approach to law lay largely dormant until the 1960s and 1970s.  In that period, Coase (1960) wrote a provocative article on the incentives to reduce harm to neighbors engendered by property rights assignments . . . and Posner wrote a comprehensive textbook (1972) . . . . 
Id.  See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (setting forth the model of efficiency that has become known as the Coase Theorem).  Like Judge Posner, these and other scholars fail to recognize and inform their students of the law and economics foundation established by John R. Commons.  52. POSNER, supra note 26, at 7.  53. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (1992) (“In a free market with no obstacles to bargaining between the parties, voluntary exchange allocates goods to their most valuable uses.”).  54. Schmid, supra note 18, at 45. 
 55. Id. at 48. 
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that a price is paid to an owner . . . does not mean that the person 
accepts the distribution of opportunity and power—only that the 
payment is better than the alternative cost given the rights structure.”56 
These and other objections have been well-stated in legal scholarship.57  
Given the realities of every economy in the world and the history of the 
economic analysis of law, it is more accurate to say that the twentieth 
century foundation for law and economics begins with John R. Commons, 
rather than Ronald Coase.58  
4.  The Main Arguments Against the Law and Neoclassical Approach to 
Law and Economics Are Not Only Value-Based Arguments 
Although each of the deficiencies set forth above reflects objections to 
law and neoclassical economics based on positive grounds, after wrongly 
equating efficiency maximization with wealth maximization, Judge 
Posner characterizes competing alternatives to the efficiency ethic as 
“competing social values . . . [that] have mainly to do with ideas about 
the just distribution of income and wealth—ideas around which no 
consensus has formed”;59 whereas in fact, on positive grounds, other 
economic approaches challenge the theoretical and empirical validity of 
the claimed neoclassical economic approach to efficiency and wealth 
maximization.  By passing off law and neoclassical economics as the 
only theory of law and economics, Judge Posner ignores important 
positive controversies in economics regarding the application of 
microeconomic theory in context, the macroeconomic effect of legal 
policy based on neoclassical theory, and the macroeconomic operation 
of the economy.  Judge Posner thus fails to inform his students that there 
is no consensus in economics that microeconomic efficiency in 
particular contexts leads to societal efficiency or wealth maximization.  
In critiquing or opposing an application of neoclassical analysis, it is not 
a competent legal strategy to argue only competing values (however 
powerful, pure, and widely accepted they may be) when the lawyer can 
also challenge the claim of wealth maximization on the facts with good 
 
 56. Id. at 34. 
 57. See generally Markovits, supra note 33 (critically analyzing the basic conceptual structure of law and economics as currently presented and practiced).  58. Schmid, supra note 18, at 40, 44; see also COMMONS, supra note 10, at vii (discussing the legal underpinnings of the economic system); Mercuro & Medema, supra note 24, at 95.  59. POSNER, supra note 26, at 252. 
ASHFORD TWO.DOC 9/17/2019  4:15 PM 
 
160 
economic authority.  It is misleading to teach students only the value-
based objections to a thesis when important fact-based objections exist. 
In the third edition of Economic Analysis of Law, Judge Posner stated 
the following: “The major ethical problem posed by an efficiency approach 
to the common law is . . . the discrepancy between efficiency maximization 
and notions of the just distribution of wealth.”60  Judge Posner apparently 
carefully considered this important misrepresentation because by the 
fifth edition, he qualified his assertion, prefacing it with the word 
“probably,” so that it reads “Probably the major . . . .”61  Even with this 
qualifier, however, Judge Posner fails to alert students to the fact that a 
major ethical problem with his efficiency approach is that it assumes 
away and ignores positive controversies in economics that are highly 
relevant to the duties of lawyers and teachers in regard to clients and 
students.  This ethical problem of nondisclosure cannot be eliminated 
without informing students about positive controversies regarding 
neoclassical claims of wealth maximization along with positive alternative 
approaches to wealth maximization within the discipline of economics. 
IV.  THE NEED TO TEACH LAW AND ECONOMICS FROM A 
SOCIOECONOMIC FOUNDATION 
A.  Introduction 
Based on the foregoing, if the goal of wealth maximization is an 
important reason for offering courses, course segments, and subject 
matter labeled “law and economics” and for teaching law-related 
economic issues within other law school courses, then as matter of 
positive understanding and professional responsibility it is necessary to 
include an economic approach broader than one limited to neoclassical 
economics.  Furthermore, it is better yet to ground that broader approach 
on the scientific, paradigm-conscious, and value-conscious foundation 
established by the definition of socioeconomics so that the approach to 
economic understanding will remain flexibly open to improvement in a 
principled way and at a pace that has not always been reflected in 
departments of economics. 
Broadening the economics of law and economics to include classical 
and Keynesian economic analysis will clearly enrich the offering.  
Together with neoclassical analysis, these approaches have served as the 
main economic theories that shape the law and economic policies of all 
major so-called market economies for more than sixty years.  Lawyers 
 
 60. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 240 (3d ed. 1986).  61. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 286 (5th ed. 1998); see also POSNER, supra note 26, at 266. 
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and law students with the fuller understanding of law-related economic 
issues provided by the combination of classical, neoclassical, and 
Keynesian economics would clearly be able to better fulfill their 
professional responsibilities than lawyers and students who understand 
only the neoclassical approach.  But the broadening of economics should 
not stop there for several reasons. 
First, these approaches (alone and in combination) have not satisfactorily 
explained in an uncontroversial way either the process of economic 
growth or the anomaly of unutilized capacity; nor have they provided an 
effective strategy or institutional environment to employ the unutilized 
capacity profitably and to promote sustainable growth.  As a result of 
perceived inadequacies of classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics 
in various important contexts, other economic approaches (including 
Austrian, behavioral, binary, contextual, ecological, humanistic, institutional, 
and post-Keynesian economics) have emerged to address problems and 
search for solutions that classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics 
have failed to successfully address and discover.  Although frequently 
ignored by many mainstream economists, some exposure to one or more 
of these additional approaches would enrich a course in law and economics. 
However, even such a broadening of law and economics beyond the 
core of mainstream economic theories does not fully address a dynamic 
question for lawyers: Given ongoing development of understanding 
regarding law-related economic issues, what approaches are needed to 
enable lawyers and law teachers to fulfill their professional responsibilities 
regarding the subject?  What approaches might be helpful to Anne, 
Bruce, Daphne, and Clark in serving clients and students?  
1.   The Lawyer’s Duty of Investigation 
It is well settled that corporate fiduciaries are duty bound to base their 
decisions on informed judgment.  In determining whether this duty is 
met or breached, the issue is “whether the directors have informed 
themselves ‘ . . . of all material information reasonably available to 
them.’”62  In formulating and implementing legal policy and representing 
clients, competence requires no less of attorneys.  When charged with 
responsibilities to serve the clients’ urgent concerns regarding law-
related economic issues (such as those related to unutilized productive 
 
 62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
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capacity and poverty), lawyers have an affirmative duty of inquiry 
regarding relevant facts and law.  Their duty is to be proactive, to act 
expeditiously, without waiting for others to act. 
Some people may be reluctant to entertain approaches at variance with 
widely accepted economic assumptions.  For some people, this 
reluctance is based on the belief that society is thereby protected from 
the wasteful and unsettling pursuit of unreal promises and from the 
adverse effects of unintended consequences.  For others, it may be based 
on their perceived interest in the status quo, including the belief that it 
takes much more work to reexamine fundamental assumptions than to 
require others to learn them.  Therefore, a burden of persuasion is placed 
on the innovator who would alter the status quo (and the distribution of 
wealth, opportunities, risks, and uncertainties it protects).  But, as a 
matter of professional responsibility on behalf of their clients, lawyers 
have an affirmative duty of positive investigation.  Consistent with that 
duty, like other fiduciaries, lawyers may not simply sit idly by because 
some other person has not met a burden of persuasion. 
2.  The Concept of the Prima Facie Case 
In this regard, law has a useful concept for promoting beneficial 
change and for correcting injustices otherwise protected by the status 
quo: namely, the concept of the prima facie case.  The concept of the 
prima facie case lightens the burden of innovators and critics of the 
status quo by requiring of them only sufficient proof to call upon the 
defenders of the status quo to respond.63  The concept of the prima facie 
case, together with the definition of socioeconomics, can assist lawyers 
and law teachers in approaching law-related socioeconomic issues.  As a 
matter of law and economic inquiry, theories and approaches that satisfy 
the requirements explicit and implicit in the definition of socioeconomics, 
but that seemingly conflict with economic analysis, may be seen as 
having sustained the burden of making a prima facie case and therefore 
are in need of further investigation even though they seemingly conflict 
with accepted economic analysis. 
Because economics is an evolving discipline that historically has been, 
and continues to be, rather resistant to consider (from a paradigm-neutral 
perspective) economic approaches that conflict with mainstream thinking, if 
wealth maximization is a major goal of teaching law and economics, 
then when teaching law and economics, theories beyond mainstream 
 
 63. OTIS H. FISK, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF PROOF IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 49–62 (1928).  
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economics (including those at and beyond the margin of economics) that 
(1) meet the standards of a prima facie case, and (2) promise substantial 
wealth maximization beyond the promise of neoclassical efficiency 
should not be kept from law students.  Rather, such theories should be 
given rigorous consideration in law schools from the paradigm-neutral 
perspective offered by the definition of socioeconomics, even though 
mainstream economics has shown little or no interest in exploring them.  
Using the concept of the prima facie case, law schools can provide a 
forum in which ideas neglected by economists, but relevant to the 
operation of the economy, can be given a hearing. 
B.  Promising Theories and Approaches Neglected by the                      
Discipline of Economics 
There are some people who may believe that, by becoming more open 
to approaches that challenge its basic assumptions, economics will be 
inundated with dubious approaches.  In reality, however, there are not 
many approaches at or beyond the margins of economics that meet the 
standards of the scientific method (workable assumptions, internal 
consistency, and predictions capable of being verified or refuted) and 
promise substantial wealth maximization and distribution by way of a 
logic not ultimately based on classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian 
economics.  For example, if every member school of the Association of 
American Law Schools were to devote one seminar to the exploration of 
one approach to wealth maximization that meets the foregoing standards 
but is nevertheless generally not explored in schools and departments of 
economics, the schools would run out of new candidates to explore in a 
few years at most.  Two such approaches are especially noteworthy: one 
by Treval Powers, a distinguished research chemist, and the other by 
Louis Kelso, an eminent corporate lawyer and investment banker.  To 
explore more fully the importance of a socioeconomic approach to law 
and economics, these are discussed briefly below.  Consideration of 
these approaches helps to reveal how a socioeconomic approach to the 
analysis of law-related economic issues can aid in the fulfillment of the 
professional responsibilities of lawyers and law teachers. 
1.  The Leakage Theory of Treval Powers 
If wealth maximization is a major goal of teaching law and 
economics, then theories beyond economics and at the margin of 
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economics may deserve a hearing in law that they are unlikely to get 
from all but a very few economists.  A good example of this proposition 
can be found in a book called Leakage: The Bleeding of the American 
Economy, by chemist Treval Powers.64  In Leakage, the reader is 
presented with an alternative theory of the operation of the American 
economy based on an extensive statistical analysis of U.S. economic data 
from 1878 through 1995.  The theory was developed by a distinguished 
scientist over a period of almost twenty-five years.  Dr. Powers 
summarized his conclusions as follows: 
(1) “After more than two hundred years of thinking and 
discussion, there was . . . little indication that economists 
had reached, or ever would reach a durable consensus 
about the nature of economics.” 
(2) “[S]tudies of economics were now, and had been, badly 
imbalanced; too much a priori thinking, not enough skilled 
observation of economic behavior.” 
(3) “[T]he vocabulary and syntax of the language of economic 
theory are mostly unsuited to the descriptions and 
discussions of the findings of this study.” 
(4) “Writers of economic textbooks emphasize the point that 
economics is a ‘soft science,’ apparently meaning that they 
find it impossible to verify their deductions by scientific 
methods.” 
(5) “[I]t simply is not true that the behavior of the national 
economy [of the United States] is not predictable.” 
(6) “Generally, the statistical record [of the United States for 
the last 125 years] proved sufficient . . . [to] provide an 
understanding of how the nation as a whole is functioning 
economically . . . quite different from any of the understandings 
developed from the evolution of economic theories.” 
(7) “[S]aving and investment do not play the part that 
economic theory gives them.  In fact, the performance of 
the nation as a whole, the macroeconomy, shows that at 
that level, savings is always a negative factor, for it is in 
fact leakage, and as such actually bleeds the vitality from 
our nation’s native productivity.” 
(8) “[T]he national income is never inadequate; it is always 
the amount necessary for full scale production.  But some 
of it is not being used for production of goods and 
 
 64. TREVAL C. POWERS, LEAKAGE: THE BLEEDING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1996). 
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services; it is being allowed to ‘leak’ from the ‘stream’ of 
productive circulation.  Leakage always reduces the economic 
output, and at times the rate of leakage exceeds the growth 
capability of the nation, the result being a shrinking of the 
economy.  Leakage is nearly always present, reducing the 
rate of economic growth and at times producing negative 
growth.” 
(9) “Analysis of the actual data showed the nation has a 
practically constant capability for growth of approximately 
11.4 percent per year per capita.  That figure plus the 
exponential rate of growth of the population has produced 
various totals ranging from about 12 to 13 percent per 
year.”65 
In some respects, Dr.  Powers’s analysis seems Keynesian, suboptimal 
employment resulting from the failure of the aggregate of all producers 
(which Dr. Powers calls the “composite producer”) to distribute sufficient 
purchasing power to consumers (the “composite consumer”) to cause the 
full utilization of existing productive capacity.  However, Dr. Powers’s 
conclusion regarding (1)  “savings . . . [as] always a negative factor” in 
macroeconomic growth, (2) the predictability of the operation of the 
U.S. economy, (3) the mathematics supporting his predictions, and (4) 
(most importantly) the magnitude of the predicted growth potential 
(above eleven percent), all indicate that an analysis very different from 
Keynesian economics is involved.66 
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the prospect of such an 
untapped growth potential is a matter of great interest to the clients of 
Anne, Bruce, and Daphne, and to Clark’s students.  Indeed, the growth 
predicted by Dr. Powers is immense.  If even one quarter of that growth 
rate could have been achieved from 1900, the resulting production 
would, by far, eclipse the gains promised by pursuit of any generally 
recognized conventional economic theory.  A sustained growth rate of 
even five percent over a decade would make an extraordinary difference, 
for example, to (1) corporate profits, (2) shareholder wealth, (3) the 
economically disadvantaged, (4) the available funding for education, 
medical research, and countless social causes that languish for more 
resources, (5) the abatement of many environmental degradations that 
 
 65. Id. at  x–xii, 25. 
 66. Id. 
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could be ameliorated if people could afford more expensive products and 
services made by way of greener technologies, (6) the funds available 
for financial aid to students (who every year graduate more in debt), and 
(7) government revenues, indebtedness, deficits, and budgets.  In light of 
these potential gains, it is as though advocates guided only by 
conventional theory have been arguing and negotiating over small 
change.  The prediction of sustainable growth of such a magnitude is a 
remarkable conclusion from a scientist that should be of great interest to 
lawyers and law teachers interested in wealth maximization; but because 
they are so far beyond the present realm of economic understanding, 
they may not even be considered by many economists in the near future. 
For lawyers and law teachers committed to the principles of socioeconomics, 
however, there is good reason not to wait for rigorous attention from 
economists before beginning to explore the issues raised by Dr. Powers, 
especially when attention from lawyers and law teachers may hasten the 
exploration by economists as well.  In principle, the work of Treval 
Powers is an experiment that can either be replicated or refuted by other 
scientists, mathematicians, and economists.  Admittedly, the validation 
or refutation of promising work like that of Dr. Powers is the work of 
people with advanced mathematical skills and cannot be expected to be 
achieved by most students enrolled in law school courses; but students 
can certainly be informed of the existence of such work, particularly in 
contexts in which a more limited understanding of wealth maximization 
would otherwise be presented as unquestioned truth. 
2.  The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso 
The notion that the broader approach to economic issues explicit in the 
definition of socioeconomics can promote a broader approach to 
economics among economists is revealed by the slow but growing 
acceptance of binary economics by professional economists.67  Like the 
 
 67. Binary economics was first advanced by corporate finance attorney, investment banker, and philosopher, Louis Kelso.  See LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958) [hereinafter KELSO & ADLER, MANIFESTO] (presenting detailed suggestions for repairing and refining the present economic system in order to create an economically just and generally affluent society); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION (1991) (arguing in favor of an economic democracy and for worker ownership of capital as a way to reach that goal); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS: A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS (1961); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967) (arguing that the usual methods employed to finance corporate enterprises lead to socialized ownership of productive capital through the systemized concentration of ownership).  The authoritative and most complete source of writings by Louis Kelso (the originator of binary economics) can be found on the web site of The 
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leakage theory of Dr. Powers, binary economics speaks directly to the 
question of persistent unutilized productive capacity.  Louis Kelso, the 
originator of binary economics, predicted growth potential of the 
American economy roughly comparable to the predictions of Dr. 
Powers, but went even further by providing a specific theoretical and 
practical means by which to achieve that growth.  Like Dr. Powers’s 
leakage approach, binary economics is in some ways similar to 
Keynesian economics, but in several crucial aspects offers an entirely 
different understanding of production and growth.  Like Keynesian 
economics and the approach of Dr. Powers, binary economics sees 
economies like that of the United States as substantially inefficient and 
recognizes endemic unutilized productive capacity that results from the 
market’s failure to distribute sufficient effective demand. 
However, in several critical respects, binary economics differs from 
Keynesian economics.  In his General Theory, Keynes distilled the 
economy to three fundamental variables: time, money, and labor.  
According to this model, there is only one independent productive 
variable: labor.  According to the one-factor approach to production 
functions, capital is a dependent variable whose only function is to make 
labor more productive.68  As a consequence, in analyzing the existence 
of unutilized productive capacity and growth with the Keynesian labor-
 
Kelso Institute.  The Kelso Institute, Bibliography, at http://www.kelsoinstitute.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).  For the Author’s presentation of binary economics as a distinct paradigm, see generally ROBERT ASHFORD & RODNEY SHAKESPEARE, BINARY ECONOMICS: THE NEW PARADIGM (1999); Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics 
of Louis Kelso: A Democratic Private Property System for Growth and Justice, in CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY 99 (John H. Miller ed., 1994); Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso: The Promise of Universal 
Capitalism, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Ashford, Binary Economics]; Robert Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, 25 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Ashford, Louis Kelso’s]; Robert Ashford, A New Market Paradigm for Sustainable 
Growth: Financing Broader Capital Ownership with Louis Kelso’s Binary Economics, 14 PRAXIS, FLETCHER J. DEV. STUD. 25 (1998).  68. As Keynes states:   It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a yield over the course of its life in excess of its original cost, than as being productive.      . . . It is preferable to regard labour, including, of course, the personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand.  This partly explains why we have been able to take the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our economic system, apart from units of money and of time. KEYNES, supra note 29, at 213–14. 
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based approach, the distribution of capital ownership is not a 
fundamentally significant determinant; and in analyzing the importance 
of effective demand, no fundamental distinction is made between the 
distribution and the redistribution of income—a distinction fundamental 
in law. 
In contrast, binary economists insist that the correct modeling of the 
economy requires two (that is, “binary”) productive factors: labor and 
capital (that is, the human factor and the nonhuman factor).  The binary 
approach treats capital as an independently productive variable whose 
most important role is to replace and vastly supplement the work of 
labor with the work of capital rather than to increase productivity.  
Therefore, according to binary economics, (1) the distribution of capital 
ownership has a potent positive effect on growth that is obscured in 
theory and suppressed in practice by treating capital as though its only or 
primary function is to increase the productivity of labor, rather than to 
do vastly more of the work itself, and (2) the persistence of unutilized 
productive capacity and the market’s failure to distribute effective 
demand are the direct consequence of the concentrated distribution of 
capital ownership (as distinguished from the distribution or redistribution of 
income).  Moreover, unlike Keynesian analysis, which does not predict 
extraordinary sustainable growth rates substantially above three percent 
or so, but more like the independent analysis of Dr. Powers, binary 
analysis views the maximum sustainable growth potential of the U.S. 
economy to be above nine percent.  In short, according to binary 
economics, unutilized productive capacity and suboptimal growth are 
the result of concentrated ownership.69 
But despite (or perhaps in part because of) the binary promise of 
enhanced sustainable growth rates, economists have been slow to 
consider the binary approach and its prediction of capital-ownership-
distribution-based growth.  Although first published in a book entitled 
The Capitalist Manifesto in 1957, coauthored by Louis Kelso and 
Mortimer Adler (a world-renowned philosopher), it was not until 1996 
that the first peer-reviewed journal edited by economists published an 
article examining binary economics as a distinct paradigm,70 and not 
 
 69. Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for 
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531, 1538–41 (2002).  70. KELSO & ADLER, MANIFESTO, supra note 67, Ashford, Louis Kelso’s, supra note 67.  Following this article, the Journal of Socio-Economics published several additional noteworthy articles: Jerry N. Gauche, Binary Economic Modes for the Privatization of 
Public Assets, 27 J. SOCIO-ECON. 445 (1998); Richard Hattwick, Book Review, 30 J. SOCIO-ECON. 563 (2001); Norman G. Kurland, A New Look at Prices and Money: The 
Kelsonian Binary Model for Achieving Rapid Growth Without Inflation, 30 J. SOCIO-ECON. 495 (2001); see also Norman G. Kurland, The Federal Reserve Discount Window, 
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until 1999 that the Journal of Economic Literature formally recognized 
“the new binary economic paradigm, which is based on the assumption 
that human and nonhuman factors are independently productive and that 
the claim on their productive output is a property right.”71 
As mentioned above, because Keynesian analysis is built on only three 
fundamental variables—time, money, and labor—with labor being the 
only productive factor, the distribution of ownership is not a fundamental 
determinant of growth or unutilized productive capacity.  Indeed, although 
they differ in many respects, most economists—whether of neoclassical, 
Keynesian, or other persuasion—share in common one unstated 
assumption: that unless it can be shown to affect the productivity of 
labor, the distribution of capital ownership is not a fundamental determinant 
of increased economic output.  Given the importance of private property 
under law and the Constitution, such an important fundamental 
assumption—that the distribution of ownership is not fundamentally 
positively related to wealth maximization—should not go unexamined 
by lawyers and law teachers from a paradigm-neutral perspective (as it 
too frequently has). 
From the perspective of scientific principles, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that capital is “independently productive.”  
Consider, for example, trees growing fruit, horses and automobiles 
(“self-moving” vehicles that haul and replace walking), vending machines 
that replace salespeople, automatic teller machines that replace tellers, 
growing varieties of robots doing ever more of the work once done by 
humans, and generally machines of all sorts (including computers) that 
replace and vastly supplement the work of hundreds and even thousands 
of people with the work of increasingly productive capital.  From a 
paradigm-neutral perspective, it is not inherently unreasonable to conclude 
(as Adam Smith did not conclude, and as the Keynes time-money-labor 
model does not imply) that in promoting growth, capital does much 
more than make labor more productive; it does ever more of the work 
itself, and because it is independently productive, the distribution of its 
ownership has a positive relationship to growth not comprehended by 
classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian economics. 
Indeed, as discussed below, at the most fundamental level, once the 
capital factor is modeled as one of two independent (or in other words, 
 
10 J. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP L. & FIN. 131 (1998).  71. Annotated Listing of New Books, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1746, 1834–35 (1999). 
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binary), productive variables, it can then be thought of as contributing to 
growth in six distinct ways.  From a binary perspective, capital does far 
more than make labor more productive, facilitate labor specialization, or 
enable the profitable employment of more workers (as Adam Smith 
envisioned its primary function).  Increasingly, capital is doing proportionately 
ever more of the work. 
Based on careful observation, capital reveals six independent powers.  
Specifically, capital can (1) replace labor (doing what was formerly done 
by labor), (2) vastly supplement the work of labor by employing capital 
to do much more of the kind of work that humans can do (such as the 
greatly increased hauling that can be done employing horses or trucks), 
(3) do work that labor can never do (for example, elevators lift tons 
hundreds of feet in the air; airplanes fly; scientific instruments unleash 
forces that create computer chips that cannot be made by hand; fruit 
trees make fruit while all farmers can do is assist in the process), (4) 
work without labor (as in the case of washing machines, automated 
machines, robots, and wild fruit-bearing trees), (5) pay for itself out of 
its future earnings (the basic rule of business investment), and (6) 
distribute the income necessary to purchase its output. The first four 
powers concern what might be considered the “real economy” powers of 
capital; the latter two are powers that are most clearly revealed in a 
private property, market economy with a stable credit system protected 
by a reliable legal system.  Each of these ways of contributing to growth 
(including mere labor replacement, which produces the same output as 
before, plus leisure), is significant, but only the first directly involves the 
substitution of capital for labor (marginal or otherwise).  Thus, although 
some economists and policy advocates use marginal efficiency theory as 
the foundation for a general theory of growth, in fact the capital-labor 
substitution process is only one component of growth (operating after 
the employment of greatly increased productive capacity).72 
C.  Positive and Ethical Responses to Promising Theories                 
“Outside the Box” of Conventional Economics 
When presented with an approach that does not fit neatly into the 
classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian paradigms, or some other 
recognized economic approach, the usual response of economists is to 
dismember and recast it into one or more of the recognized forms.  But 
such a response is not scientific and will never do justice to a new idea.  
The first step in the scientific assessment of a theory is to understand the 
theory in its own terms, not merely to assess it with respect to one or 
 
 72. ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra note 67, at 146–47. 
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more preexisting theories.  Understanding a theory in its own terms requires 
an understanding of its assumptions, its definitions, the fundamental 
variables and their relations to one another, and the implications that 
flow from them.  Thereafter follows an analysis of internal consistency 
and then empirical analysis of the descriptions and predictions that 
follow.  There is nothing scientific about rejecting a new theory because 
it conflicts with other theories that are generally accepted or because it 
attempts to explain something that is already explained in a different 
way by another approach.  The scientific test of the value of one 
paradigm compared to others is whether it (1) better describes and 
predicts more of the relevant observable phenomena or (2) resolves one 
or more important anomalies left unexplained or unresolved by others. 
Likewise, in law, to do justice to an argument, the first duty of the 
lawyer and the judge is to understand the argument in its own terms.  
Only then can the argument be fairly judged in the light of precedent, 
positive law, and underlying policy.  The lawyer or judge who listens to 
the beginning of an argument and then interrupts the presenter by saying, 
“What you are saying sounds something like what other people have 
said before, so I will assume that you are saying what they were saying 
and judge accordingly” is doing no justice at all.  No scientist, 
economist, lawyer, or judge faithful to the definition of socioeconomics 
would behave in that way. 
It is important to note, moreover, that alternate paradigms need not be 
mutually consistent to be useful.  Sometimes, paradigms complement 
and supplement understanding, as exemplified by the distinct conceptual 
contributions to physics made, for example, by Newton, Planck, Heisenberg, 
and Einstein.  Sometimes, paradigms conflict and are yet informative of 
different aspects of the “same” reality, as in wave theory and particle 
theory, which are both used to describe the properties of electrons.  
Indeed, much economic theory and practice make use of conflicting 
neoclassical, Keynesian, behavioral, institutional, and other models to 
explain the same behavior.  Dr. Powers’s theory of leakage and Louis 
Kelso’s binary economics should not, therefore, be excluded from the 
array of conceptual tools used to understand economic behavior merely 
because their premises conflict with conventional theory or because they 
each explain supposedly the same economic behavior in fundamentally 
different ways.  Even those who highly value the classical, neoclassical, 
and Keynesian paradigms should be open to a paradigm-neutral 
exploration of the theory of leakage and binary economics to determine 
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whether they might provide important insights regarding the persistence 
of unutilized productive capacity and how it might be profitably 
employed to reduce economic deprivation while benefiting everyone. 
Unutilized productive capacity to produce more and do better is an 
important anomaly to most clients and students, and theories that offer to 
explain, predict, and profitably employ it should be considered by 
lawyers, even though economists have not yet done so.  Although they 
start with different premises and employ different methodologies to 
reach their conclusions, there is a remarkable congruence between the 
analysis of Treval Powers and Louis Kelso.  Most notable are their 
predictions of extraordinary sustainable growth rates of approximately 
the same magnitude.  Also notable is their conclusion that savings and 
investment do not play the part in promoting growth that conventional 
economic theory gives them. 
If Anne, Bruce, Clark, and Daphne take seriously their professional 
responsibilities to clients, students, and the public interest, including the 
duty of positive inquiry, the fact that economics departments have been 
slow to consider the approach of Treval Powers and Louis Kelso may 
persuade them to explore these subjects and other subjects neglected by 
all but a few economists by way of a broader approach to economics 
resting on the scientific method and other principles set forth in the 
definition of socioeconomics.  The exploration of promising ideas 
beyond existing paradigms will be aided by institutions, such as the 
AALS Section on Socio-Economics, that promote the open-minded but 
rigorous approach to economic understanding described in the definition 
of socioeconomics. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
One essential role of the lawyer is to help clients identify and secure 
their rights and responsibilities.  The clients’ economic rights and 
responsibilities are an important aspect of the lawyer’s role.  Because the 
socioeconomic approach is in fundamental harmony with thinking and 
acting like a lawyer regarding facts and values, to fulfill this role, it is 
not surprising that the rules of professional responsibility implicitly call 
upon lawyers to approach law-related economic issues from a 
socioeconomic perspective rather than from a perspective limited to law 
and neoclassical economics.  Lest they teach by bad example, law 
teachers should also teach law-related economic issues from a 
socioeconomic perspective. 
Given an obligation of balance and full disclosure, teaching a subject 
labeled “law and economics” from no more than a neoclassical perspective 
is problematic because such an approach fails to recognize the full array 
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of economic theories and empirical evidence that call into question the 
neoclassical approach and provide other ways to comprehend economic 
issues and guide legal policy. 
Without much qualification and supplementation, the neoclassical 
approach does not provide an adequate foundation for teaching law-
related economic issues, because without a broader foundation, the 
neoclassical approach to law and economics (1) confuses a microeconomic 
theory of efficiency with wealth maximization and growth,73 (2) fails to 
address the persistence of unutilized productive capacity, (3) fails to 
address other positive controversies regarding neoclassical principles 
and their application in context, and (4) falsely teaches that the major 
objections to and controversies regarding the neoclassical approach are 
primarily value-based without disclosing relevant objections to law and 
neoclassical economics that suggest that it is wrong on the facts. 
Although teaching law-related economic issues and offerings in law 
and economics would be substantially improved by employing a broader 
approach to economics that includes Keynesian, classical, and other 
economic approaches, a socioeconomic approach provides an even better 
foundation for addressing law-related economic issues and for teaching 
law and economics.  This is because it is more comprehensive, 
interdisciplinary, and open, in a rigorous and even-handed way, to 
additional approaches to economic understanding. 
Socioeconomists recognize that one of the worst effects that faulty 
reliance on paradigms can have on theoretical, empirical, and normative 
analysis is to exclude or obscure other approaches and to divert attention 
from important principles that must be understood before progress can 
be made.  For example, every day, people see the sun rise and the sun 
set, but what they see is a grand illusion built on a faulty paradigm 
resting on a false assumption.  When the earth-centered paradigm for the 
solar system was replaced by the sun-centered paradigm, a false 
 
 73. A neoclassical approach that leaves growth-related theories of distribution at the door, falsely equates efficiency maximization with wealth maximization, and generally denies that attempts to broaden distribution could have nothing but negative effects on overall efficiency and wealth maximization is suspect to many people,  including economists and socioeconomists, who find no unambiguous evidence for such propositions.  See, e.g., KEEN, supra note 15, at 3–4; SOLO, supra note 17, at 91.  The neoclassical approach is highly controversial according to the broader approaches to economics as taught in economics departments (but ignored in many courses labeled “law and economics” and in many courses significantly influenced by law and neoclassical economics).  KEN COLE ET AL., WHY ECONOMISTS DISAGREE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMICS viii (1983). 
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assumption resting on an illusion was replaced by a true assumption 
based on facts, and the foundation was laid for the discovery of 
Newton’s laws (which make no sense in an earth-centered solar system) 
and much of modern science.74 
Based on the socioeconomic grounding in the scientific method rather 
than the neoclassical paradigm as the starting point for law-related 
economic analysis, there is reason to believe that the great emphasis that 
neoclassical economics places on efficiency as the sole or primary 
means of promoting societal wealth maximization may rest on a false 
assumption of causation.  The correlation between (1) increased 
efficiency and productivity and (2) increased growth may be the result of 
a mathematical residual, rather than a causal relationship.75  In other 
words, according to many economists, measured increases in productivity 
are a consequence rather than a cause of growth.76 
Few students earn degrees from universities and law schools without 
being falsely taught that attempts to broaden distribution do not increase 
the size of the pie but merely redistribute different portions of the same 
sized pie, and worse yet, will tend to erode the incentives for making 
more pie.77  But students have a right to know that the neoclassical 
approach is not the only economic approach to distribution and growth.  
Socioeconomics is open to other theories that hold that broader 
distribution can have a positive impact on wealth maximization. 
The interests of clients and students are not limited to the size of the 
pie, the size of their slices, and the size of their slices in relation to the 
slices of others.  Clients have an interest in understanding (in the 
complicated mix of private and public activity) how the pie is made and 
how they might legitimately increase their participation not only in the 
pie but also in the bakery.78 
 
 74. Aristarchus of Samos, in a remarkable insight, first proposed the sun-centred solar system in the third century A.D.  For Aristarchus’s work, see generally SIR THOMAS HEATH, ARISTARCHUS OF SAMOS: THE ANCIENT COPERNICUS (1959).  Galileo proposed the geocentric alternative, was accused of heresy, and was forced to recant.  The “facts” of the geocentric paradigm were empirically verifiable and considered beyond dispute for over fourteen hundred years.  Some principles that were difficult to understand by almost everyone in one era can be taught to grade school children in the next.  Presently, the concept of geocentrism is taught to grade school children.  75. Marc-André Pigeon & L. Randall Wray, Demand Constraints and the New 
Economy, in A POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 158, 160–61, 180 (Paul Davidson ed., 2002).  76. Correlation does not establish causality.  There is a strong correlation, for example, between the numbers of people who carry umbrellas when leaving home and the incidence of rain.  The correlation is statistically significant and good enough for much social science.  Nevertheless, carrying umbrellas does not cause rain, but rather is a consequence of the true causes for rain.  77. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 369–70.  78. Ashford, supra note 69, at 1576; Ashford, Binary Economics, supra note 67, at 
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To this end, the socioeconomic approach calls for (1) an evenhanded 
consideration of all the relevant economic and other theories—whether 
or not they have been validated by a critical mass of economists, (2) an 
identification and assessment of their underlying assumptions, and (3) an 
analysis of how well the theories apply in context as well as they do in 
idealized circumstances. 
In the context of substantial unutilized productive capacity that 
persists despite the guidance from classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian 
economics, based on socioeconomic principles, and the concept of a 
prima facie case, socioeconomics can provide the foundation for exploring 
wealth-enhancing approaches at or beyond the margin of economics that 
are conceptually distinct from the neoclassical, Keynesian, and other 
approaches.  Working in harmony with the process of legal inquiry, the 
definition of socioeconomics can enable lawyers and law teachers to 
provide a forum in which to give promising theories a paradigm-neutral 
hearing that they have been denied by economists.  For example, two 
promising approaches to economics growth—the leakage theory of 
Treval Powers and the binary economics of Louis Kelso—which have 
been given little or no attention by economists, are especially worthy of 
exploration. 
With a modest investment of time, it is not difficult to enable law 
students to appreciate the contribution that socioeconomics can make to 
their legal education.  Most students come to law school with a sense 
that, in general, the difference in approaches and policies championed by 
most people on the political left, right, and center, most democrats, 
republicans, liberals, conservatives, libertarians, and socialists are significantly 
connected to their understanding or misunderstanding of economic 
issues.  With the benefit of a socioeconomic education, when considering the 
analysis, positions, and policies advanced by various people and institutions 
in society regarding many law-related economic controversies, students 
can come to understand that important differences in opinion regarding 
law-related economic issues have deep roots in the neoclassical 
economics paradigm, reactions to it, and other approaches offered to 
complement, supplement, or replace it.  And it is not difficult for them to 
come to appreciate that, with a socioeconomic approach, teaching and 
learning the law and pursuing ways to improve the law can proceed with 
 
6 (pointing out that “[b]inary economics is an important legal issue because it presents an alternative private property system structured to enable all people to acquire a viable capital estate”). 
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greater competence and candor. 
The socioeconomic approach is essential to law teaching and practice 
because it helps students, clients, lawyers, and teachers to identify and 
secure essential rights and responsibilities.  The socioeconomic approach 
is important not only as a means of assisting lawyers in realizing better 
ethics in legal representation; it may have even greater value in assisting 
academics to realize better ethics in teaching, scholarship, and service 
and in assisting students to understand the ethical obligations of their 
teachers when teaching law-related economic issues. 
 
